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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989 government funding for the arts through the National En-
dowment for the Arts (NEA)' came under fire. Conservative groups vig-
orously attacked two controversial exhibits that received funding from
the NEA.2 As a remedy for this supposedly inappropriate funding, con-
1. The National Endowment for the Arts is an independent agency of the federal govern-
ment charged with awarding grants to projects on the basis of significant artistic merit. 20 U.S.C. §
954 (a), (c)(1)-(2) (1988).
2. The works of Andres Serrano and Robert Mapplethorpe generated these controversies.
See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of these works; see also Vince Pas-
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servative groups lobbied Congress strenuously either to dismantle the
NEA or to limit its funding on the basis of content.3 The arts commu-
nity responded with a vigorous campaign decrying such limits as an af-
front to artistic freedom and First Amendment rights.4 Congress placed
the NEA, its funding procedures, and its record under close scrutiny
when the agency applied in 1989 for its 1990 reappropriation 5
As a result of this scrutiny, Congress enacted in 1989 a set of con-
tent-based limitations on projects that the NEA and its parallel organi-
zation, the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), could
fund.6 Under these limitations, both endowments could not fund ob-
scene art, including homoerotic art and art depicting individuals en-
gaged in sexual conduct.7 Congress further instructed the NEA that the
two institutions that sponsored the controversial art projects could re-
ceive no further grants without prior congressional approval. 8 While
some championed the 1989 law as a victory for artists in light of the
more restrictive limitations discussed by Congress, others felt that even
these lesser limitations violated the First Amendment.9
Congress revisited both the NEA and the NEH in 1990, this time
in the form of a reauthorization of these endowments. While Congress
removed some of the restrictive language in the 1989 law,10 it estab-
saro, Funds for the Enfeebled - The NEA Wrangle: A No-Win Situation for Artists, HARPER'S
MAGAZINE, Dec. 1990, at 60, 65 (noting the participation of two conservative activists, Revs. Pat
Robertson and Donald Wildmon, in beginning the debate over NEA funded projects).
3. Senator Jesse Helms introduced legislation prohibiting the funding of art that would be
offensive to almost any segment of the public. See infra notes 92 to 93 and accompanying text.
4. See Nicols Fox, NEA Under Seige: Artwork Sparks Congressional Challenge to Agency's
Reauthorization, NEw ART EXAMINER, Summer 1989, at 18-23.
5. See George Hager, Every Voter's a Critic on Arts Funding: Moral Outrage Against
Federally Subsidized Exhibits Puts NEA's Congressional Sponsors on the Spot, 47 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 2174, 2174 (1989).
6. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-121, § 304, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 701, 741-42.
7. The statute stated:
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for the National Endowment for the Arts or
the National Endowment for the Humanities may be used to promote, disseminate, or pro-
duce materials which in the judgment of the [NEA] or the [NEH] may be considered obscene,
including but not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual ex-
ploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts and which, when taken as a whole, do
not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at § 304(a); see infra note 97 (setting forth the test for obscenity enunciated in Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
8. Id. tit. II, at 738.
9. See, e.g., Karen Faaborg, Some Constitutional Implications of Denying NEA Subsidies
to Arts Projects Under the Yates Compromise, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 397 (1990); Ste-
phen F. Rohde, Art of the State: Congressional Censorship of the National Endowment for the
Arts, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 353 (1990); Note, Standards for Federal Funding of the Arts:
Free Expression and Political Control, 103 HARv. L. RFv. 1969 (1990).
10. Arts, Humanities, and Museums Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, §§ 103, 107,
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lished entirely new procedures for grant making by the NEA related to
obscenity.11 Congress also removed the limitations placed on the NEH
grant making procedures by the 1989 law and imposed no new obscen-
ity limitations on the NEH.1
Controversy surrounding the NEA is not new. Several times during
its history Congress has focused its attention on the procedures and
records of the Endowment, and has imposed or removed various restric-
tions and oversight procedures in the wake of controversy." Congres-
sional action in 1989 shows a willingness by its members to see the
NEA and the NEH as indistinguishable and, therefore, not subject to
different concerns.14 As such, Congress imposed the same restrictions on
both endowments in 1989. Although the 1990 legislation lifted earlier
restrictions, new demands for restrictive content-based limitations may
arise as a result of some future controversy. Because the NEA received
a new set of limitations in the 1990 law, Congress obviously believes
that it can continue to place restrictions on grants awarded by these
endowments.
While commentators have addressed the effect of content-based
limitations on the NEA,' 5 the potential effect of such limitations on the
NEH has been overlooked. Because the NEH focuses primarily on
scholarship, funding limitations raise special concerns under the First
Amendment." This Note argues that content-based limitations on gov-
ernment funding of scholarship should receive strict scrutiny from the
courts because of the necessity of maintaining academic ffeedom.'
Since strict scrutiny imposes a significant burden on the government to
show that such limitations are constitutional," very few limitations
would overcome that burden.
Part II of this Note begins with a discussion of the history of the
National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities, then reviews the
way Congress regulates the endowments. Part III discusses two doc-
trines in First Amendment law, unconstitutional conditions and aca-
demic freedom. Part IV discusses how these two doctrines apply to the
NEH funding process and work together to mandate strict scrutiny
analysis for NEH grants in the face of content-based limitations. This
104 Stat. 1961, 1963, 1969 (1990); see infra part II.D. for a discussion of these amendments.
11. Id. at § 103(h). See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
12. Id. § 103(b) (applying obscenity restrictions to the NEA only).
13. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
14. This Note argues that the NEH is subject to unique concerns. See infra part III. These
unique concerns require differential treatment for the NEH.
15. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
16. See infra part III.A.
17. See infra part III.B.
18. See infra part IV.
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Note concludes by arguing that this high level of protection should
shield the NEH from extensive content-based regulation.
II. THE NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR THE ARTS AND HUMANITIES
A. History of the Foundation
Traditionally, artists and scholars in the United States have relied
on the private sector for support.19 Such support has come primarily
from two sources, wealthy individuals who commissioned and collected
art, and universities and other organizations that subsidized and main-
tained journals and scholars.20 This system of reliance on private pa-
tronage traces its roots to ancient times.2' Reliance on market forces,
however, dictated that only art and scholarship that was popular with
mainstream America received support.22
The arts and humanities received little government support prior
to 1965.23 Although President Roosevelt created a Federal Arts Project
during the New Deal to subsidize artists, the project sought to address
unemployment rather than to foster artistic achievement for its own
sake. 24 The subsidies stopped when unemployment was no longer a par-
amount concern and the United States faced new problems.2 5 Other at-
tempts to provide government support were never enacted.2"
Noting the success of the National Science Foundation in support-
ing scientific research, scholars and artists called for similar support for
19. See Kathleen D. McCarthy, American Cultural Philanthropy: Past, Present, and Fu-
ture, 471 ANNALS 13, 14-15 (1984).
20. Id. at 15-16. McCarthy also notes that private charitable foundations, such as the Car-
negie Foundation, supported art and cultural projects. Their support, however, was limited in
amount and scope. Id. at 17-18. Corporations did not become a significant source of funding until
the 1970s. Id. at 21.
21. Some of Western culture's greatest accomplishments were the result of a private commis-
sion by a wealthy patron.
22. McCarthy focuses on the democratic nature of certain forms of popular art. For example,
she notes that "rustic" actors often performed Shakespeare in makeshift theaters. McCarthy also
notes that these were profit-making ventures and that all those who could afford to pay the en-
trance fee could gain admittance. McCarthy, supra note 19, at 14.
23. See, e.g., Kenneth Goody, Arts Funding: Growth and Change Between 1963 and 1983,
471 ANNALS 144, 146 (1984) (stating that before 1965, support for the arts from federal and state
governments "most certainly have been low").
24. DICK NETZER, THE SUBSIDIZED MUSE: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE ARTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 54 (1978). The government, of course, has subsidized some art. For example, Congress in
1817 commissioned Revolutionary War scenes to hang in the Capitol. Even earlier, the Library of
Congress collected art and music under its authority to assemble materials for the use of Congress.
For a chronology of federal arts funding, see Evolution of Federal Arts Funding, CONG. DIG., Jan.
1991, at 3.
25. NETZER, supra note 24, at 54.
26. Such efforts included bills introduced by Senator Claude Pepper in 1938 and by Senator
Jacob Javits in the 1940s. Neither bill became law. Marie Tessier, Public Support for the Arts
From the WPA to the NEA, 1 CONG. Q. EDITORIAL RES. REP. 308, 308-09 (1990).
HUMANITIES FUNDING
their work.27 They argued that while technology received direct govern-
ment support, the arts and humanities suffered as a result of declining
private support.2 8 The arts and humanities deserved direct government
support, they argued, because technological advances created more lei-
sure time, which Americans could spend on the arts and humanities.2 9
Furthermore, scholars and artists feared that technology would come to
dominate American life. 0
These advocates of a humanities organization lobbied Congress to
recognize that government sponsorship of the arts and humanities
could enrich American cultural and scholarly life."1 In 1965, the advo-
cates achieved their goal. Congress created the National Foundation on
the Arts and the Humanities (the Foundation),3 an organization dedi-
cated to unleashing and encouraging creative talent in the United
States. Congress, thus, determined that the government had a proper
role in encouraging creativity in the United States,33 and foresaw that
the Foundation could take a leading role in the advancement of art and
scholarship.3 4
The Foundation was established as an independent agency of the
federal government that receives an appropriation authorized by Con-
gress.3 5 Periodically, Congress considers the entire agency in a more ex-
tensive review called a reauthorization. Through its two branches, the
NEA and the NEH, the Foundation distributes its appropriation money
by awarding grants to those projects that have substantial merit.36 The
27. LIVINGSTON BIDDLE, OUR GOVERNMENT AND THE ARTS: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE INSIDE 59-
61 (1988) (discussing a report by a group of scholars calling for federal aid to the humanities).
28. Goody, supra note 23, at 145.
29. See BIDDLE, supra note 27, at 76-77.
30. Id.
31. For a history of this lobbying see id. at 3-55.
32. 20 U.S.C. § 953 (1988).
33. Id. § 951(1).
34. Id. § 951(2).
35. See 20 U.S.C. § 960 (1988) (detailing the annual appropriation for the endowments). In
addition to the flat sum of the appropriation, the endowments also receive federal matching funds
in an amount equal to the bequests, donations, and devises to the endowments. Id. § 960(a)(2).
In 1990, Congress appropriated $147,000,000 to the NEA and $143,750,000 to the NEH for use
in 1991 and 1992. Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, tit. 2, 104 Stat. 1915, 1956 (1990).
Estimates that compare the level of arts and humanities funding in the United States with other
countries vary. One 1985 study found that United States citizens pay $3 per capita in direct gov-
ernment support, and $13 including tax expenditures. In comparison, Canadians spent $32, the
West Germans $27, the British $10, the Italians $14, the Dutch $29, and the Swedes $35. J. MARK
DAVIDSON SCHUSTER, SUPPORTING THE ARTS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 45 (1985).
36. "[A]rtistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which applications are judged,
taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and val-
ues of the American public. . . ." Section 103(b), 104 Stat. at 1963 (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. §
954(d)(1)). This statement of the criteria modifies an earlier statement which emphasized only
artistic merit. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1988) (amended 1990).
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NEA funds art, and the NEH funds scholarship. Other organizations
are part of the Foundation, but these function mainly as support orga-
nizations for the two endowments.3 7
The birth and the ensuing history of the NEA and NEH, however,
are not represented solely by the original congressional purposes. In the
debates surrounding the creation of the endowments, several problem-
atic issues arose. 8 For whatever reason, early dissent manifested itself
in the first reauthorization of the NEA in 1968, when many House
Republicans voted against reauthorization. 9
These concerns largely have been answered in the years following
the creation of the Foundation.40 The question of the proper extent of
congressional oversight over the Foundation, however, remains unset-
tled. This question dominated the initial debates over the Foundation.
Some congressional members felt that the Foundation needed complete
independence from government interference, while others felt that it
should reside within an existing government bureaucracy to provide
greater accountability.41
Over the years, congressional members have continued to express
37. These organizations include the National Council on the Arts, the National Council on
the Humanities, and the Federal Council on the Arts and Humanities. The role of the two national
councils is discussed infra at notes 74 to 76 and accompanying text. The Federal Council on the
Arts and Humanities is an advisory committee. 20 U.S.C. § 958(c) (1988).
38. First, dissenters questioned the constitutionality of grants of public funds to arts and
humanities practitioners. Second, artists and some members of Congress feared that artists would
come under the control of the government. Third, some argued that the endowments would redis-
tribute wealth improperly from low-income taxpayers to high-income taxpayers. Fourth, dissenters
felt that if the private market would not support the arts and scholarship, the government should
not disturb the market with a direct subsidy. Lecture by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., National Acad-
emy of Sciences (Apr. 13, 1988), reprinted as America, the Arts, and the Future: The First Nancy
Hanks Lecture on the Arts and Public Policy, in THE FUTURE OF THE ARTS 3, 4 (David B. Pank-
ratz & Valerid B. Morris eds. 1990). Schlesinger catalogues the four issues and calls them "mis-
leading, overwrought, or simply wrong." Id. at 4. See discussion infra note 40 for Schlesinger's
answers to each of the issues.
39. The House Republicans voted 2 to 1 not to reauthorize the NEA.
40. Schlesinger, supra note 38, at 4. Schlesinger argues that the constitutional questions sur-
rounding the endowments are irrelevant today because no one has presented a serious constitu-
tional challenge to them. Schlesinger also believes that Congress had power to create the
endowments under the General Welfare Clause. He cites George Washington and others who ex-
tolled the value of the humanities and the arts to support his proposition. Id.
Schlesinger dismisses the fear of government interference in arts and scholarship by stating
that none has occurred. Id. at 5. The Mapplethorpe and Serrano controversies, however, weaken
this assertion. Schlesinger similarly dismisses the argument that a subsidy equals a transfer of
wealth by stating that the arts and humanities are beneficial to all segments of society. Id. Finally,
Schlesinger equates the endowments with schools and hospitals, which also receive subsidies, to
dismiss the argument that the arts and humanities can survive in a free market. He asserts that
the endowments provide a function as. vital as the other institutions, and, like them, need a sub-
sidy to exist. Id.
41. See BIDDLE, supra note 27, at 81-82.
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their concerns over the NEA's proper level of accountability in light of
several grants awarded to controversial projects. In 1973, a controversy
arose over an NEA grant to Erica Jong, author of the book, The Fear of
Flying.2 This novel shocked many Americans with its use of sexually
explicit language and situations. This controversy led to a questioning
of NEA procedures in congressional debate.43
Public attacks on government subsidies to the arts have forced
Congress to revisit the endowments on several occasions. For example, a
controversy arose over a New York City production of the opera Rigo-
letto.4" Italian-Americans complained that the production was deroga-
tory and presented stereotypes of Italians. The resulting congressional
action included a proposal by Representative Mario Biaggi to restrict
funding of racially offensive material.45 When the NEA funded an artist
to drop leaflets from an airplane to create a living sculpture, Senator
William Proxmire awarded the agency his famous Golden Fleece
award.46 While Congress enacted no content-based legislation as a re-
sult of these controversies, Congress sent a clear message to the NEA:
Avoid art projects which may offend constituents.
In spite of congressional dissent and a history of controversial
funding decisions, the endowments have advanced the arts and scholar-
ship in the United States. At the time the NEA was established, 10
choruses, 110 symphony orchestras, 37 dance companies, 56 nonprofit
theaters, and 27 opera companies existed in the United States. Today,
our country boasts 80 choruses, 230 symphony orchestras, more than
250 dance companies, over 420 nonprofit theaters, and 120 opera com-
panies. 7 One observer has likened this increase in artistic activity
under the NEA to a cultural renaissance. 48Similarly, the NEH has advanced scholarship in America. While
42. See id. at 316; Rohde, supra note 9, at 361-62. In the same year, the NEA received fur-
ther criticism due to a one word poem which appeared in a NEA funded literary anthology. Id. at
361.
43. For example, Rep. Robert Bauman criticized the NEA for funding the production of a
"horny novel." 121 CONG. REC. 19,145 (1955).
44. See The Grant Making Process of the National Endowment for the Arts: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
98th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1984) [hereinafter Endowment Hearing]. See generally Enrique R. Carrasco,
Note, The National Endowment for the Arts: A Search for an Equitable Grant Making Process,
74 GEo. L.J. 1521 (1986) (analyzing the controversy over the Rigoletto production and the subse-
quent congressional reaction).
45. Representative Biaggi's proposal would have prohibited funding to any "ethnic or racially
offensive material." Endowment Hearing, supra note 44, at 2. (statement of Rep. Biaggi).
46. Senator Proxmire awarded the Golden Fleece to governmental projects which he felt
wasted taxpayers' money.
47. Passaro, supra note 2, at 61.
48. Id. (stating that "the NEA rightly sees itself as having been a catalyst over the past two
decades for the creation of a very large system of public and private arts patronage").
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data on scholarship activity is not documented as accurately as data on
artistic activity, at least one significant statistic indicates similar growth
in the humanities. One of the NEH's functions has been to fund schol-
arly journals and publications.49 The number of such publications ex-
ploded in the period following the creation of the NEH. Other NEH
successes include the Civil War documentary series, produced by Ken
Burns, which received broad critical and popular acclaim. The Founda-
tion has achieved these successes in an environment free from direct
political control5" over the content of funded projects. Continued suc-
cess depends on maintaining freedom in funding decisions. In the case
of the NEH, in particular, political interference in funding decisions
will hinder the essential goal of promoting scholarship. The essential
goal of scholarship should be the quest for the truth in a particular
subject area.5'
B. NEH Procedure Prior to 1989
In funding scholarship, the NEH focuses on subjects as diverse as
religion, history, art history and criticism, languages, philosophy, litera-
ture, and ethics, among others.5 To receive NEH funding, a project
should advance scholarship and research in a humanities subject, im-
prove humanities education, or promote understanding and interest in
the humanities among Americans." The NEH, as a matter of policy,
will not fund certain projects. For example, recipients generally may
not use grants to pursue an academic degree, to promulgate political or
ideological propaganda, or to create original works of art.54
Once a scholar determines that a particular project falls within the
49. The NEH's Division of Public Programs funds scholarly projects which appear in public
fora. See infra text accompanying note 58. As a result of such funding, The International Direc-
tory of Little Magazines and Small Presses has grown from a mere pamphlet in 1965 to a thick
and extensive manual. The Reverend Timothy Healy, president of the New York Public Library
and past president of Georgetown University, called the NEH the best subsidizer of scholarly jour-
nals. Hearing on the Rights of Artists and Scholars to Freedom of Expression and the Rights of
Taxpayers to Determine the Use of Public Funds: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Postsecon-
dary Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 53-54 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Hearings on Rights].
50. The process traditionally followed by the endowments, and the nature of political control
over their funding decisions, are described infra part II.B.
51. The quest for the truth in scholarship has been subject to the doctrine of academic free-
dom, which guarantees scholars the right to study theories and ideas, no matter how controversial
or unpopular. See infra part III.B. for a discussion of the doctrine. While most cases discuss how
academic freedom relates to universities only, this Note argues that the similar nature of the NEH,
in funding scholarships, requires similar protection.
52. 20 U.S.C. § 952(a)(1988).
53. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES, OVERVIEW OF ENDOWMENT PROGRAMS 5
(1991).
54. Id. at 5-6.
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scope of the NEH, he must submit an application to one of five divi-
sions or two offices at the Endowment. The five divisions of the NEH
are: Education Programs, Fellowships and Seminars, Public Programs,
Research Programs, and State Programs.5" Through the Division of Ed-
ucation Programs, the NEH makes grants to such educational institu-
tions as grade schools, high schools, and colleges in order to improve the
quality of humanities instruction. The Division of Fellowships and
Seminars provides grants mostly to college level professors to study and
research humanities subjects for fixed periods of time. 7 The Division of
Public Programs makes grants to scholarly projects that make the hu-
manities available to the general public. These are projects that will be
presented to the public on television and radio, in museum exhibits, or
in some other public forum.5 8 The Division of Research Programs sup-
ports extended and complex research, preparation of texts, and organi-
zation of reference materials." The Division of State Programs
supports state humanities councils.60
The NEH also makes grants through two offices. The Office of
Challenge Grants works to encourage private investment in the human-
ities by pledging to add federal dollars to private donations to educa-
tional institutions.6 1  These grants seek to support long-term
investments in the humanities, such as institutional endowments, con-
struction and renovation of buildings, and equipment purchases.2 The
Office of Preservation funds projects aimed at archiving and preserving
newspapers, books, journals, and other humanities research materials. 63
When an application first arrives at the NEH, the staff reviews the
application for compliance with technical and procedural require-
ments.6 4 The staff then refers compliant applications to panels com-
posed of the applicants' peers for review of scholarly merit.6 5 Through
the use of the peer panels, the NEH has achieved a high degree of insu-
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id. at 9-10.
57. Id. at 11-13.
58. Id. at 14-15.
59. Id. at 16-19.
60. Id. at 20.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 21.
64. Id. at 6. The NEA follows procedures very similar to those described for the NEH. See
National Endowment for the Arts Application/Grant Process, CONG. DIG. Jan. 1991 at 6. While the
procedures are similar, however, they also contain certain differences. See infra notes 121-27 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the differences related to the 1990 Amendments. For a dis-
cussion of the different customs of the two endowments, see infra notes 135-38 and accompanying
text.
65. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES, supra note 53, at 6.
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lation from the political process and bureaucratic control in its funding
decisions and maintained a high level of quality in its funding choices."
The peer panels are composed of experts in different fields of
scholarship. Each panel specializes in a particular field, such as litera-
ture, art criticism, or history.6 7 Members of the panel include scholars
and professionals in that particular field. The chairperson of the En-
dowment selects panel members on the basis of expertise and diversity,
with no need for confirmation by Congress or the President.68 The com-
position of the peer panels changes frequently. No more than twenty
percent of each incoming class of panel members may stay for longer
than three years.6 9 To further assure the isolation of the panels from
political pressure, no scholar may serve on a panel or subpanel when
the panel or subpanel considers his own application. 0
The panels select worthy applications on the basis of enumerated
criteria. Under the procedures followed until 1989, these criteria fo-
cused solely on the scholarly merit of the project. 71 Indeed, Congress
originally created the panels to ensure that funded projects met the
standards of scholarly excellence and to insulate the endowments from
bureaucratic control.7 2 Prior to the creation of the peer panels, only a
presidentially appointed council reviewed applications.7 3
The presidentially appointed councils have continued to play a role
in the selection process in spite of the use of peer panels. After a peer
panel reviews an application, the panel forwards it to the council.7 4 The
council then reviews the application and, in turn, forwards the applica-
tion to the chairperson of the Endowment.75 The chairperson has the
66. The Civil War Documentary produced by Ken Burns is an example of a universally ac-
claimed NEH-funded project.
67. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES, supra note 53, at 6.
68. 20 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1988). The exact criteria were as follows: "[Elach Chairperson shall
appoint individuals who have exhibited expertise and leadership in the field under review, who
broadly represent diverse characteristics in terms of aesthetic or humanistic perspective, and geo-
graphical factors, and who broadly represent cultural diversity." Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. These criteria are codified at 20 U.S.C. § 954(c)(1)-(8) (1988). See supra note 36 for the
text of the newest criteria.
72. See Note, supra note 9, at 1973. The use of peer panels fulfills the congressional directive
that no "department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States shall exercise any direction,
supervision, or control over the policy determination, personnel, or curriculum, or the administra-
tion or operation of any school or other non-Federal agency, institution, organization, or associa-
tion." 20 U.S.C. § 953(c) (1988).
73. The President's council contained twenty-six members.
74. See NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES, supra note 53, at 6.
75. Id. While the councils have generally supported the projects approved by the panels, a
funding controversy may make the councils scrutinize applications more closely. See Tessier, supra
note 26, at 307.
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final authority to overrule the determinations of the panel.7 s
The Foundation also works in conjunction with state councils on
the arts and humanities to fund projects.7 7 These councils award sub-
grants of Foundation money and administer other funds.78  Besides
making grants themselves, the state councils further the goals of the
Foundation by promoting local involvement in the arts and
humanities. 79
The growth in artistic and scholarly activity cannot be attributed
solely to grants provided by the national and state governments. Pri-
vate grants and subsidies account for much higher dollar amounts than
Endowment grants.80 To receive private funding, however, an artist or
scholar often needs to receive the imprimatur of an Endowment grant.81
Private funding sources tend to avoid making an independent determi-
nation of merit, viewing the endowment's peer review system as a guar-
antor of the merit of funded projects."2 If an applicant fails to receive a
grant, his work may be perceived as failing to rise to the level of signifi-
cant art or scholarship.
In promoting scholarly and artistic merit, the endowments have
balanced the needs of the grant recipients, private sponsors, local gov-
76. See NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES, supra note 53, at 6. But see Hearings on
Rights, supra note 49, at 34 (statement of Rev. Timothy Healy, President of the New York State
Public Library and former President of Georgetown University, pointing out the inconsistency
between the goal of political independence and the final authority on awards resting in the hands
of a federal official).
77. See NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES, INTRODUCTION TO STATE PROGRAMS
(1985).
78. Id. at 5-9. In 1988, the budgets of the state councils surpassed the budget of the NEA by
almost $80 million.
79. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES, supra note 77, at 3. The state councils use a
funding procedure that is similar in many ways to the procedure used by the endowments. For
example, the state councils use peer review panels. Id. at 15. Significant differences, however, be-
tween the state councils and the Foundation do exist. The standards for state peer review panels
vary from state to state, and may differ from the Endowment's standards. Id. at 3. For example,
state panels may consider local audience preferences in addition to artistic or scholarly excellence.
Id. at 16. Furthermore, the state government may retain more control and may exercise closer
scrutiny over the state councils occasionally taking an active role in the development and presenta-
tion of a funded project. See Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 793 (1st Cir. 1976)
(upholding a provision of the state humanities commission procedures in which the governor of the
state has final authority over the grants); NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES, supra note
77, at 11.
80. See, e.g., Passaro, supra note 2, at 61 (noting that in 1989, $153 million in NEA grants
spurred $1.4 billion in funding from private sources; another $6 billion in funding from private
sources was awarded independent of NEA grants). The 1985 study comparing funding for the arts
in several countries, supra note 35, found that the lower figure for the United States did not reflect
the large amount that private sources gave to the arts. Such generous private supporters did not
exist in the other countries in the study. SCHUSTER, supra note 35, at 45.
81: See, e.g., Hearings on Rights, supra note 49, at 54 (statement of Rep. Pat Williams).
82. Id.
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ernment, and the ultimate audience for funded projects. The Founda-
tion functions as a stimulant to the world of the -arts and humanities,
rather than as an independently-functioning, self-contained agency.
Congress has disturbed this balance when it has enacted content-based
restrictions on the endowments in the past.
C. Congress's First Response to Controversy: The 1989 Restrictions
Two events sparked the acrimonious and well-publicized review of
the endowments in the summer of 1989. The first controversy focused
on the federally funded Piss Christ by Andres Serrano.8 3 Piss Christ
was a plastic crucifix immersed in a jar containing Serrano's own
urine. 4 When the exhibit came to the attention of Reverend William
Wildmon and his fundamentalist Christian organization, the American
Family Association, they launched a letter-writing campaign to Con-
gress decrying the anti-Christian nature of the work.8 5 The letters casti-
gated Congress for allowing such a work to receive federal funding.8
Reverend Wildmon also took his case to the general public with adver-
tisements in such publications as U.S.A. Today.
In the meantime, officials at the Corcoran Gallery of Art in Wash-
ington, D.C. decided to cancel The Perfect Moment, a funded exhibit,
shortly before its opening date.8 7 The Perfect Moment, by Robert Map-
plethorpe, included homoerotic and sadomasochistic photographs.8
Gallery officials noted the growing furor over federal funding of art, and
the fact that this art offended some members of the public as the bases
for their decision. Ironically, while Corcoran officials sought to avoid
public controversy over the overt sexual nature of The Perfect Moment,
cancellation of the exhibit only inflamed the underlying conflict be-
tween taxpayers who objected to federal funding of what they consid-
ered obscene, and artists and the arts audience who wanted to
encourage creativity and freedom of expression."
83. Andres Serrano has received broad acclaim for his artistic works. He won an important
award, the Award in the Visual Arts, in 1988, and has participated in the Bicentennial Exhibition
at the Whitney Museum of American Art. See Fox, supra note 4, at 18.
84. See Passaro, supra note 2, at 65.
85. Fox, supra note 4, at 19.
86. See Tessier, supra note 26, at 304. (quoting a Democratic congressional staffer who said
that some sectors of the public believed that the NEA promotes pornography).
87. See Passaro, supra note 2, at 65-66.
88. Id. at 65. A Cincinnati museum director later was prosecuted under the Ohio obscenity
law when he exhibited The Perfect Moment at the museum. He was acquitted. Barrie Says Politi-
cal Control Motivated Charges Against Art Center, UPI, Nov. 17, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis library, OMNI file.
89. Passaro, supra note 2, at 65-66.
90. One member of Congress summed up the debate at the House subcommittee hearings on
the 1990 Amendments as follows:
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Reverend Wildmon and his followers received sympathy from Sen-
ator Jesse Helms. Senator Helms had been a long-time critic of the en-
dowments, arguing that artists should survive according to the dictates
of the marketplace, not according to the dictates of a government
agency."' Harnessing the pressures placed on Congress by the letter-
writing campaign, Senator Helms in 1989 attached legislation to the
1990 agency reappropriation bill that placed severe content-based re-
strictions on the endowments. 92 These restrictions would have prohib-
ited the agency from funding art that could be offensive to any segment
of American society.9 The Helms restrictions received Senate approval,
but failed to survive in the House of Representatives.9 4
Supporters of the Helms Amendment, however, did not go unre-
warded for their efforts. In 1989 Congress included the first ever con-
tent-based limitations on Foundation grants in the 1990
appropriation.95 Under these limitations, the endowments added a re-
quirement that projects not be obscene in addition to their prior test of
artistic excellence.98 To guide the endowments in this determination,
Congress created a commission to study the implementation of new
standards for funding such as the Miller v. California test for obscen-
ity.97 As a further guide, Congress listed several subjects that it classi-
The purpose of this hearing is to consider two powerful American imperatives. The first is the
absolute necessity to protect freedom of expression, and in this case the freedom of artists to
express themselves freely and to engage in the creative process without restraint.
The second imperative is the right of taxpayers through their elected officials to deter-
mine how their tax dollars shall be spent.
Hearings on Rights, supra note 49, at 2 (statement of Rep. Williams).
91. As Senator Helms said, "it is [tlime for them [artists], as President Reagan used to say,
'to go out and test the magic of the marketplace.'" 135 CONG. REc. S8808 (daily ed. July 26, 1989).
92. Senator Helms' proposal would have prohibited funding of the following materials:
(1) obscene or indecent materials, including but not limited to depictions of sadomasochism,
homo-eroticism, the exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts; or
(2) materials which denigrate the objects or beliefs of the adherents of a particular religion or
non-religion; or
(3) material which denigrates, debases, or reviles a person, group, or class of citizens on the
basis of race, creed, sex, handicap, age, or national origin.
135 CONG. REc. S8807-8 (daily ed. July 26, 1989).
93. One commentator noted that while a majority of Americans believe that experts shouldjudge the quality of art, these criteria would impose on the endowments Congress' judgment as to
the quality of art. Arthur I. Jacobs, One if by Land, Two if by Sea, 14 NovA L. REv. 343, 343 (1990)
(citation omitted).
94. Rather than adopt a version of the Helms Amendment, the House voted to instruct its
conferees merely to "address the concerns contained" in the Helms Amendment. 135 CONG. REC.
H5630, H5640-41 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1989).
95. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-121, § 304, 103 Stat. 701, 741-42 (1989).
96. Id.
97. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller test has three elements:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find
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fled as per se obscene and as ineligible for funding: "depictions of
sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, and
or individuals engaged in sex acts .... " While they echoed some of
the Helms Amendment's concerns, these limitations were less restric-
tive than those proposed by Senator Helms.
To fulfill these conditions, the NEA required applicants to sign a
certification swearing that they would not produce obscenity and would
comply with any Endowment findings of obscenity. 9 This pre-certifica-
tion process was challenged in Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v.
Frohnmayer. °00 The Lewitzky court held that the certification require-
ment and the restrictions it sought to enforce violated the applicants'
Fifth and First Amendment rights to due process and free speech.101
The Due Process Clause violation arose because the Endowment, itself,
made obscenity determinations. The district court struck down this
provision, holding that the Supreme Court's Miller test required a jury,
applying local standards, to make this determination.1 0 2 The free
speech violation arose under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.103
The court also struck down the certification requirement as an uncon-
stitutional condition on the receipt of NEA grants.0 Ironically, the
NEH, in its interpretation of the 1989 limitations, did not require these
pre-certification promises.0 5
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest... ; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24. The Court in Miller upheld the use of this test by a jury in an adversarial proceeding
using local community standards. Id. at 30-31. The Court was not presented, however, with the
question of whether this test could constitutionally be applied in another context, such as when an
agency makes grant determinations.
98. Pub. L. No. 101-121 § 304(a), 103 Stat. at 741.
99. For a description of the certification process, see Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v.
Frohnmayer, No. 90-3616, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 332 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1991) (describing how the
NEA required such certification prior to the release of any funds).
100. Id. The plaintiffs were two nonprofit corporations, one of which performed modern
dance and the other exhibited visual art. Both applied for NEA grants, but refused to sign the
certification that their projects would not be obscene. On this basis, plaintiffs received no funds
from the NEA. Id. at *2-8.
101. Id. at *34-36.
102. Id. at *25. In addition to the fact that the Endowment was not equipped to apply the
Miller text correctly, the court noted that the 1989 law did not require the Endowment to apply
the Miller test for obscenity in the first place. Id.
103. Id. at *33-35. For a discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see infra part
III.A.
104. Id. at *36.
105. See Hearings on the Reauthorization of the National Endowment for the Arts: Hear-
ings Before the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education of the Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 190 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings on Reauthorization]
(statement of Lynne Cheney, Chairperson, National Endowment for the Humanities and National
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Congress also placed special limitations on the institutions involved
with the Piss Christ and Perfect Moment exhibits. These two institu-
tions, the Southeastern Center for Contemporary Art in Winston-Sa-
lem, North Carolina and the Institute of Contemporary Art at the
University of Pennsylvania, made subgrants of Foundation money to
these artists. Under the 1989 restrictions, neither institution could re-
ceive funds without Congress's prior approval of the project.10 6 Con-
gress, thus, retained the power, otherwise delegated to the endowments,
to make grants to these two institutions.
Senator Helms boasted that the enacted restrictions would send
the appropriate message to the NEA.10 7 Other conservative opponents
of the endowments vowed that the future would bring further debate on
the issue of endowment grants. 0 8
D. Congress's Second Response to Controversy: The Arts,
Humanities, and Museums Amendments of 1990
For the opponents of the endowments, the funding limitations en-
acted in 1989 did not provide adequate guidance and congressional
oversight of the grant-making process. Opponents of the endowments
continued their battle when the Foundation appeared before Congress
for its 1990 reauthorization. The taxpayers' right not to subsidize offen-
sive art was couched in terms of wise administration. The terms of the
debate created the danger that politicians opposing restrictions would
appear to be pro-obscenity. 09
In 1990 members of Congress introduced a variety of schemes that
were designed to safeguard against the funding of offensive projects.
Representative Philip Crane proposed an amendment to abolish the
NEA altogether. 110 Representative Dana Rohrabacher sought to expand
the list of de facto obscene subject matter found in the 1989 limita-
tions."' Senator Helms introduced amendments that mirrored his pro-
posals from the previous year." 2 Representative Pat Williams sought
Council on the Humanities).
106. Tit. II, 103 Stat. at 738.
107. See Jesse A. Helms, Art, the First Amendment, and the NEA Controversy, 14 NovA L.
REv. 317 (1990) (defending the enacted restrictions while calling Congress' decision not to enact
his legislation "unwise").
108. See e.g., Henry Hyde, The Culture War, NATIONAL REVIEW, Apr. 30, 1990, at 25-27.
109. This danger became real for 21 Democratic members of Congress who voted against the
restrictions in 1989. The National Republican Congressional Committee sent press releases to their
districts accusing the members of supporting obscenity. See Tessier, supra note 26, at 312.
110. Crane Amendment to H.R. 4825, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. H94320 (daily
ed. Oct. 11, 1990).
111. Rohrabacher Amendment to H.R. 4825, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. H9442-43
(daily ed. Oct. 11, 1990).
112. Helms Amendment to H.R. 4825, 101st. Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S16626 (daily
1992]
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increased oversight by shifting more funding decisions to the state
councils, where local procedures presumably would not fund offensive
projects.113 In the end, Congress reached a compromise that retreated
from some of the 1989 limitations. The 1990 legislation, called The
Arts, Humanities and Museums Amendments of 1990, reinstated artis-
tic or scholarly merit as the sole criterion in funding decisions, but reit-
erated the 1989 imperative of not funding obscene projects.11
This compromise shifted the burden of determining obscenity from
the endowments to the courts. Under the new scheme, a state must
bring suit against a grant recipient under applicable obscenity laws to
determine whether a project is obscene after the project is complete. 15
If a court determines that a funded project is obscene, the Endowment
Chairperson may then impose a variety of sanctions on the offender. 6
The Chairperson may demand repayment of federal dollars or refuse
future funding to the grantee for a fixed period of time.117
These new restrictions remove the constitutional concerns that the
Lewitsky court had with the 1989 restrictions. The 1990 restrictions
eliminate the due process violation because a jury determines obscenity
by applying the Miller test in the course of a full trial."18 Because the
endowments no longer make this initial obscenity determination, artists
gain added procedures beyond the preliminary application in which to
demonstrate the artistic merit of their work. Furthermore, the 1990
amendments remove the First Amendment unconstitutional condition
violation." 9 Artists may receive federal funding for their projects with-
out an initial obscenity determination, and, thus, can receive the pri-
vate funding attendant to endowment funding.
The 1990 law also cures the First Amendment chilling effect caused
by the old restrictions.120 Grant applications following the 1990 amend-
ments do not include the problematic certification requirements. The
1990 amendments, however, state emphatically that the NEA will not
fund obscenity.' 2'
The 1990 amendments include other language directed at the con-
ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
113. Representative Williams reasoned that shifting more funding decisions to the states
would produce projects that closely track local community values. See 135 CONG. REc. H9422-23
(daily ed. Oct. 11, 1990).
114. Pub. L. No. 101-512 § 103(b), 104 Stat. at 1963-64 (amending 20 U.S.C. 954(d)).
115. Id. § 102(c), § 103(h), 104 Stat. at 1964, 1065-66.
116. Id. § 103(h), 104 Stat. at 1965-66.
117. Id.
118. See supra note 102.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Pub. L. No. 101-512 § 103(b), 104 Stat. at 1963.
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cerns of conservative lawmakers. Congress imposed a new purpose on
the Foundation - to promote public confidence in the administration
of taxpayer funds.12 The amendments also impose new responsibilities
on the NEA chairperson in the development of funded projects.
As one of these responsibilities, the NEA chairperson may disburse
a grant only under an installment plan that the chairperson devises to
ensure the grantee's continued compliance with the conditions of the
grant.123 A grantee initially may receive a maximum installment of two-
thirds of the total grant. To release the rest of the grant, the NEA
chairperson must review the progress of the project and determine con-
tinued compliance. 4 Presumably, compliance includes the continued
artistic merit of the project. If the chairperson determines that a devel-
oping project has become obscene and is without artistic merit, further
installments could be withheld without resorting to the panel review
process.12 5
This last procedure places the NEA under strict political control.
By placing continued funding in the discretion of the chairperson, the
new procedures can influence the artist to moderate any offensive mate-
rial in the project. This procedure also gives the chairperson the power
to undermine the decisions of the panels. Because the chairperson is a
politically appointed official, his views will tend to reflect those of his
superiors. This new accountability in the NEA is inconsistent with the
principle that the funding decisions of the endowments should be free
from political control.1 26
The 1990 amendments, however, impose no similar responsibilities
on the NEH chairperson. 27 While Congress scrutinized the NEH dur-
ing the hearings on these new procedures,128 the absence in the NEH's
recent history of any controversies spared it from special legislative
treatment. 2 9 Congress, however, seemed to send a general message to
both endowments through its selective application of funding limita-
tions. The uncontroversial NEH received no reprimand, while the con-
troversial NEA received a reprimand. The message from Congress is
clear: Endowments do not rouse our constituents with offensive projects
122. Pub. L. No. 101-512 § 101(5), 104 Stat. at 1961 (amending 20 U.S.C. § 951).
123. Pub. L. No. 101-512 § 103(g), (j), 104 Stat. at 1965.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Indeed, the 1990 law stated that "[i]t is necessary and appropriate for the Federal Gov-
ernment to help create and sustain ... a climate encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, and
inquiry. . ." 20 U.S.C. § 951(5) (1988).
127. See Arts, Humanities and Museum Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, § 103(b),
104 Stat. 1961, 1963-64 (1990).
128. See Hearings on the Reauthorization, supra note 105, at 166-322.
129. Id. at 189-90.
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and we will not question your procedures.
Two factors explain the different treatment that Congress gave the
NEA and the NEH in 1990. First, each endowment has a different pur-
pose. One seeks to promote excellence in original works of art while the
other promotes excellence in scholarship.130 Second, the NEH requires a
higher level of information about projects from applicants. 131 These two
factors worked together to shield the NEH from much controversy in
recent years.
Excellence in art produces images which tend to be more powerful
than words in their ability to generate controversy. A graphic photo-
graph or sculpture attacks the viewer in an almost visceral way. Upon
seeing the image, the viewer immediately receives the shock value. One
must read and understand words, however, interacting with the text in
a rational way."3 2 The offensive or shocking subject matter of scholar-
ship is usually an unconventional idea. The greater visceral power of
images, however, does not diminish the capacity of scholarship and
literature to shock and offend. Unpopular ideas and banned books litter
history.13 3 Indeed, scholarship has come under fire in the United States
even in this century.' Because of the absence of a deeply controversial
idea fueling unpopular or radical scholarship, such as Marxism was in
the 1950s, 35 NEH funded projects have failed to create controversy.
In addition, the NEH has avoided controversy by requiring appli-
cants to provide more detailed information about their projects prior to
receiving a grant. For example, the NEH will require a television show
applicant to submit scripts, detailed descriptions, scholarly research to
be presented, and any other information relevant to the project. 3 This
130. For a statement on the mission of each endowment, see 20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (NEA), §
956(c) (NEH) (1988).
131. See Hearings on the Reauthorization, supra note 105, at 189 (statement of Lynne Che-
ney, the NEH chairperson) (stating that "we know what the applicant's [sic] to us intend to do
with federal funds before the grant is made").
132. See LYNNE A. CHENEY, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES, HUMANITIES IN
AMERICA 17 (1988) (asking "[w]hen giving oneself over to moving pictures on the screen is so easy
and when those pictures are so vivid, who will want to undertake the demanding work of decoding
... a printed page?").
133. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1,
13 (listing some well-known books such as LADY CHATTERLEY'S LOVER that have been declared
obscene).
134. Much of this debate has centered on the political beliefs of professors. This has been the
basis of controversy in academia from Marxism in the 1950s, see Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957) (discussed infra notes 193-206 and accompanying text), to today's debate over the
"political correctness" and "hate speech" movements.
135. Several of the cases on academic freedom discussed infra arose from the anticommunist
fear that was pervasive in this era. See infra notes 193-206 and accompanying text.
136. See Hearings on the Reauthorization, supra note 105, at 189 (statement of Lynne
Cheney).
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heightened showing of information allows the NEH to sift through the
applications carefully and to eliminate projects that may be lacking in
scholarly merit.1 1 7 As one congressional member noted, the NEH has
been spared controversy due to its success in focusing on scholarly
merit.13 8 An emphasis on scholarly merit, however, would not necessa-
rily shield the NEH from controversy because valid scholarship may be
offensive or unpopular.139
While several congressional members praised the uncontroversial
nature of the NEH during the 1990" hearings, 40 present praise for the
NEH could turn into disdain should a public controversy involving the
NEH arise. Several commentators have interpreted the NEA controver-
sies as a debate over values.14 ' Conservative congressional members
have corroborated this analysis. Because NEH grants fund the explora-
tion of values and ideas directly,"42 a debate equal in fervor to the NEA
debate may extend to the NEH if the NEH funds a project challenging
mainstream sensibilities while still containing scholarly merit. There-
fore, it is important to find some First Amendment principles that will
protect NEH funding decisions in the event that such a public contro-
versy results in the imposition of content-based regulation on the NEH.
137. Id. During the hearings, one grantee praised this heightened requirement of information
because it "puts producers through their paces" on a project. Id. at 237 (testimony of Ken Burns).
138. Rep. Coleman noted the distinction: "I guess as far as we're concerned.... the account-
ability for the humanities is present and functioning and that still remains to be resolved with the
arts." Id. at 231.
139. A current debate involving the validity of controversial scholarship revolves around Dr.
Leonard Jeffries, Jr. of the City University of New York. Dr. Jeffries teaches, among other things,
that melanin, which gives skin black pigmentation, also makes blacks intellectually superior to
whites. The case of Dr. Jeffries is discussed by Samuel Weiss, Are There any Enforceable Limits
on Academic Freedom of Speech, New York Times, Nov. 10, 1991, at E8. Were Dr. Jeffries to
receive an NEH grant, the NEH likely would come under fire.
140. Hearings on the Reauthorization, supra note 105, at 230-31 (statement of Rep.
Coleman).
141. See Gary Indiana, Democracy, Inc., ARTFORUM, Sept., 1989, at 11-12 (discussing censor-
ship and homophobia in the arts). Representative Robert Dornan characterized the debate as
follows:
It is clear . . . that America is engaged in a kulturkampf, or culture war .... America is
struggling to define its moral and ethical foundations ....
It is time for average Americans to take their country back from the amoral elites - in the
universities ... in certain sectors of the arts community and elsewhere - who have nothing
but contempt for them and their way of life. It is time to put the NEA out of business.
135 CONG. REc. H9440 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1990).
142. The main criterion for the NEH is "substantial scholarly and cultural significance." 20
U.S.C. § 956(c)(4) (1988).
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III. SCRUTINY OF FUNDING: FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS
A. Government Subsidies and the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine
Congressional advocates of strict funding limitations on the endow-
ments maintain that governmental subsidies to the arts and humanities
are privileges granted by Congress and are not required by the Consti-
tution." " These advocates further argue that because artists and schol-
ars may express themselves in the absence of federal funding,
limitations on funding do not violate the First Amendment.1 44 Thus,
the advocates of content-based limitations argue that Congress may
place any limitations it desires on endowment grants. 4 5
While conceding that particular government subsidies are not re-
quired by the Constitution, the Supreme Court of the United States has
limited the power of the government to condition subsidies in certain
instances.1 46 This limitation, known as the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, prevents the government from blocking access to a First
Amendment right through the use of a powerful inducement such as a
government subsidy or a tax deduction. The Court uses this doctrine to
prevent the government from regulating speech indirectly when it can-
not regulate it directly.147 In order for a condition on a subsidy to be
constitutional, the condition must survive strict scrutiny analysis. 4 8
143. See 135 CONG. REC. H9437 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1990) (statement of Rep. Norman
Shumway).
144. See Helms, supra note 107, at 319.
145. Id.; 135 CONG. REC. H9444-45 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1990) (statement of Rep. Armey) (dis-
cussing the right of the taxpayer to refuse funding for offensive art).
146. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Federal Com-
munications Comm'n. v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (stating that "even though government may deny [a] benefit for any number
of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests - especially,
his interest in freedom of speech").
The Court has used the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to protect other constitutional
rights besides freedom of speech. For example, the Court used this doctrine to protect freedom of
religion in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). For discussion of this use of the doctrine, see
Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term - Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions,
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5, 11 (1988) (and references therein).
147. The scope and the application of this doctrine has received extensive analysis in the
legal literature. Many authors have questioned its rationale, its validity, and its use, or misuse, in
particular cases. See Epstein, supra note 146; Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Prob-
lem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1415 (1989); Symposium, Unconstitutional Condi-
tions 70 B.U. L. REv. 593 (1990); Gary A. Winters, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions as "Nonsub-
sidies" When is Deference Inappropriate?, 80 GEo. L.J. 131 (1991).
148. Speiser v. Ransdell, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958) (applying strict scrutiny analysis to a con-
dition as a subsidy).
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Strict scrutiny analysis requires the government to show that a compel-
ling justification exists for the condition and that the condition is nar-
rowly tailored to this justification. 149
The Supreme Court's first pronouncement on content-based limita-
tions on government subsidies occurred in Speiser v. Randall.150 In
Speiser, a California law required citizens to sign an oath of loyalty to
the United States in order to receive a property tax exemption.' 5 ' Sev-
eral veterans refused to sign the oath and failed to receive the exemp-
tion.152 They claimed that California's failure to award them the
exemption violated their First Amendment rights.153
The Supreme Court held that when California withheld the subsi-
dies based on the plaintiff's refusal to take the oath, the government
deterred political statements and, in effect, coerced citizens into ab-
staining from making such statements. 5 4 The Court proclaimed that
the coercive effect of the regulation infringed on constitutionally pro-
tected speech because it was aimed specifically at the suppression of
dangerous ideas.155 In Speiser, the government mandated loyalty oaths
in order to suppress advocacy of a particularly dangerous idea at the
time-Marxism.16 The Court found that the state interest advanced by
the regulations was insufficient justification for its regulation of
speech. 15
7
The Court in Speiser was unclear as to the limits of the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine. In Regan v. Taxation With Representa-
tion, 15  the Court implicitly clarified these limits and in the process
gave meaning to the suppression of dangerous ideas language in
149. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 231 (defining the strict scrutiny stan-
dard as requiring that "the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end").
150. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
151. Id. at 514-15. The oath stated: "I do not advocate the overthrow of the Government of
the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means, nor
advocate the support of a foreign government against the United States in the event of hostilities."
Id. at 515.
152. Id. at 515.
153. Id. at 517. To be more precise, the citizens argued that the regulations infringed on their
First Amendment rights as they apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
154. Justice Brennan wrote for the Court that "[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who
engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect
is the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech." Id. at 518.
155. Id. at 519.
156. Id. at 530 (Black, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 529. California argued that the State's interest involved deterring veterans, who
were special role models in society, from encouraging disloyalty to the government. Id. at 528. The
Court called the loyalty oath a "short-cut" for the more extensive procedures the State should
have used to curtail unlawful speech. See id. at 529.
158. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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Speiser. In Regan, the plaintiff challenged a statute that regulated tax
exempt organizations and their contributors. Under the statute, to
maintain the tax exemption for its contributors, the organization could
not conduct substantial lobbying activities.1 59 The statute, thus, pre-
vented the use of tax deductible contributions to subsidize lobbying.
The plaintiff claimed that the regulation of lobbying placed an uncon-
stitutional restraint on free speech by restricting access to a govern-
ment subsidy. 60
The Court held that the regulation did not place an unconstitu-
tional condition on the receipt of the exemption; rather, it simply re-
fused to subsidize a certain kind of activity.1 6' Absent the regulation,
the organization could continue to lobby, but without a government
subsidy. 6 2 The Court found Speiser distinguishable because in Speiser
the government had infringed on a fundamental right. The Court found
that there was no fundamental right to government-subsidized lobby-
ing. 63 Because no fundamental right was involved, the Court applied
the rational basis test to the statute. 6 4 Under this deferential test, the
Court found that the statute was constitutional.
65
Underpinning the Court's decision in Regan was a finding that the
statute reflected permissible concerns over the allocation of resources
rather than impermissible regulation of the content of speech. Thus,
the Court did not apply strict scrutiny. 66 The Court reasoned that a
First Amendment violation does not arise every time Congress chooses
not to subsidize an activity. 67 In Regan the plaintiff still could engage
in lobbying in the absence of tax exempt status. The plaintiff merely
could not lobby at the expense of the public.'68 Indeed, the Court relied
expressly on the content-neutrality of the statute. Because the statute
did not regulate the content of the lobbying, it did not attempt to sup-
159. Id. at 543.
160. Id. at 543-44
161. Id.
162. Id. at 548.
163. Id. at 545-46.
164. Id. at 549. The Court displayed broad deference to Congress. In the estimation of the
Author, the 1989 Endowment restrictions would pass this scrutiny because it is at least rational for
Congress to regulate the use of taxpayer funds. Under the Court's strict scrutiny analysis as used
in Speiser, however, Congress would need a compelling justification and a narrowly defined means
in order to limit federal funding.
165. Regan, 461 U.S. at 550.
166. Id. at 549-50. In addition to the finding that no content-based regulation existed in
Regan, the Court noted the lack of a suspect classification, such as race or national origin, at work.
Id. at 548.
167. Id. at 546.
168. Id.
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press dangerous ideas. 169 The Court noted that a different case would
arise if Congress tried to suppress dangerous ideas through a grant or
denial of a subsidy. In such a case, Congress, by choosing which activi-
ties to subsidize, would be regulating content. 17 0
The contrast between Speiser and Regan emphasizes the funda-
mental concerns underlying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
The Court seems to give heightened scrutiny to content-based regula-
tions aimed at suppressing dangerous ideas. In Regan, the tax statute
applied equally to all organizations that fell under its regulation. These
organizations could lobby for any purpose or express any viewpoint and
not receive different treatment. The mere fact that the plaintiffs' organ-
ization received different treatment did not regulate the content of lob-
bying by their group or other organizations. In Speiser, however, the
government's loyalty oath created a distinction based on content and
discriminated between two types of speech - one pro-United States
and the other anti-United States. The Supreme Court's analysis, thus,
implies that while Congress may place some regulation on subsidized
speech, content-based regulation is improper when it suppresses partic-
ular ideas, especially those ideas that can be called dangerous. Congres-
sional regulation of subsidized speech is constitutional only when it
suppresses speech regardless of content.
Under Speiser and Regan, Congress may not condition NEH
grants on restrictions aimed at suppressing dangerous ideas. If Congress
enacted a restriction stating that only those projects favorable to the
Democratic Party or the Republican Party could receive NEH grants, it
would constitute an improper restriction. 7 1 In this scenario, Congress
would have attempted to suppress ideas dangerous to one party or the
other without a compelling justification. Similarly, Congress could
choose to subsidize scholarship involving the United States Constitu-
tion, but could not instruct the NEH to subsidize only a particular
viewpoint on the subject. 7 Through such selective subsidization, Con-
gress would be favoring certain viewpoints and effectively suppressing
other potentially dangerous ideas.
169. Id. at 548.
170. Id. In the case of suppression of dangerous ideas, the Court asserted that it would apply
strict scrutiny. Id.
171. See Kreimer, supra note 147, at 1374-75; Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech and
Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REv. 593, 611 (1990). Kreimer argues that funding decisions based on such
political preferences are invalid because they are not "germane to the program's purpose."
Kreimer, supra note 147, at 1375.
172. In celebration of the bicentennial of the Constitution, the NEH announced a special
project to solicit scholarship of the Constitution.
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After the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rust v. Sullivan,173
commentators have questioned whether analysis under the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine is still relevant.17 4 While Rust may narrow
the general scope of the doctrine, this Note argues that it leaves the
suppression of dangerous ideas language of the Speiser and Regan deci-
sions untouched.
In Rust, the Court upheld regulations of the Department of Health
and Human Services which prohibited recipients of family planning
funds from proposing abortions or referring patients to doctors willing
to perform abortions. 75 Relying on the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine, petitioners, doctors and recipients of funds, argued that these
regulations infringed on their freedom of speech. 6 Specifically, they
argued that the regulations discriminated on the basis of content and,
therefore, were different from those in Regan.17
The Court, however, held that the regulations did not discriminate
on the basis of content. For the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to
apply, a condition must apply to a valid recipient, not to the entire
program. 17 8 In Rust, the regulations permissibly discriminated between
eligible and ineligible clinics, ensuring that only qualified clinics receive
funds under the statutory scheme. 7 9 In effect, the Court accorded great
deference to the government in reaching this decision in Rust.5 0 The
Rust decision allows the government to restrict subsidization on the ba-
sis of content by characterizing the speech as not qualifying for the sub-
sidization in the first place. It would seem that under this deferential
approach, many content-based conditions are valid. The Court, how-
ever, expressly determined that the regulations could not target danger-
ous ideas, but found that abortion advocacy was not a dangerous
idea.' 81 Thus, the Court specifically retained the unconstitutional condi-
173. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Rust closely fol-
lows, and expands upon, his dissent in Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402-08 (1984).
174. See Winters, supra note 147, at 145-56. Winters finds that under the new understanding
of the doctrine, "the Court [will] view most government allocation schemes affecting constitutional
rights as presumptively acceptable policy decisions about how to allocate resources." Id. at 132.
175. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1764-66. The statute authorizing funding to the clinics stated that
"[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion
is a method of family planning." Id. at 1764-65. Prior to the regulations promulgated in 1988,
recipients could counsel patients about abortion under this statute.
176. Id. at 1771.
177. Id. at 1772.
178. Id. at 1774.
179. Id. at 1773.
180. See Winters, supra note 147, at 132 (noting the Court's preference for viewing funding
limitations as "presumptively acceptable policy decisions").
181. 111 S. Ct. at 1772.
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tions doctrine as applied to the suppression of dangerous ideas.
Significantly, the Court distinguished Rust from a previous case,
Keyishian v. Board of Regents,182 in which the regulation of expression
at a university through government funding was found unconstitu-
tional."" The Court expressly found that universities play such an im-
portant role in society that they are fundamental to its development. 8 "
Because universities are so fundamental, limitations on university
speech should command strict scrutiny analysis, in spite of the Rust
holding. 85 The maintenance of a strict scrutiny standard in this area
would support the view that any content-based regulations on the NEH
also should be exposed to strict scrutiny analysis.
B. Academic Freedom and the First Amendment
The First Amendment prevents the government from regulating
speech.' 8 The Judiciary and legal scholars have recognized the funda-
mental value of this freedom, yet have differed on its rationale. Various
models exist as to what the First Amendment protects and what it does
not protect. 18 7 Uncontested is the principle that political speech should
receive full First Amendment protection because our democratic
scheme of government requires it. 88
Professor Alexander Meiklejohn theorized that academic speech
forms an essential element of the citizen's need to be informed for the
purposes of democratic politics. 89 Through this process of learning, cit-
182. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). In Keyishian, the Court invalidated a New York law requiring
professors to deny that they were ever communists. Id. at 592-93.
183. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776.
184. Id.
185. Id.; see also Winters, supra note 147, at 133 (noting that the Court will "perk up its ears
only when it finds.., that a differential subsidy represents an effort to stifle one clearly-defined
viewpoint in a debate").
186. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech ...... US. CoNsT.
amend. I.
187. Compare Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT.
REV. 245 (arguing that the First Amendment protects only speech that is related to the functioning
of democratic politics and that such speech is protected absolutely) with Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1949) (reviewing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: AND
ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)) (urging the qualified protection for a broad range of
speech); and Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877 (1963) (arguing that the government may regulate speech only when that speech becomes
action).
188. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (stating that "every citi-
zen shall have the right to engage in political expression and association"); Meiklejohn, supra note
187, at 263-64 (concluding that political freedom is embodied in the First Amendment.)
189. Professor Meiklejohn wrote: "the people do need novels and dramas and paintings and
poems, 'because they will be called upon to vote.'" Meiklejohn, supra note 187, at 263 (citation
omitted). As for intellectual freedom, Professor Meiklejohn found that "there can be no doubt that
the citizens of this nation need that teaching. Without it, the program of self-government is
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izens formulate preferences and make informed decisions about their
society. Their decisions are expressed through voting in the democratic
process.190 If Professor Meiklejohn is correct, then academic speech
merits full First Amendment protection as an important form of politi-
cal expression. 191 Other scholars, however, have argued that such ex-
pression has no direct influence on the political process. 92
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,e' a plurality of the Court foreshad-
owed Professor Meiklejohn's analysis of academic speech and laid the
foundation for a heightened protection of academic speech. In Sweezy,
a New Hampshire statute gave the State Attorney General the power to
investigate subversive persons in order to remove such persons from
public employment. 9 4 Sweezy was a Marxist professor at the University
of New Hampshire who refused to answer questions during the course
of an investigation on the content of a lecture in which he discussed
Marxism and socialism. 95 He argued that the First Amendment pro-
tected him from an investigation into the subject matter of his lectures
at the University.9 6 Sweezy was jailed for contempt for his failure to
answer the questions. 97
A plurality of the United States Supreme Court found that New
Hampshire's action impermissibly infringed on Sweezy's right to aca-
demic freedom and political expression without a compelling justifica-
tion." 8  The plurality applied strict scrutiny analysis to the
regulations. 199 The plurality stated that it could not conceive of any cir-
cumstances when the government could interfere with academic
doomed to futility ...." ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 129 (1965).
190. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 189, at 128.
191. For a thorough discussion on the history of academic freedom and its treatment by the
courts, see J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment", 99
YALE L.J. 251 (1989). For Professor Byrne, judicial opinions discussing the constitutional right of
academic freedom are fraught with "paradox or confusion." Id. at 252. This Note argues that the
recent University of Pennsylvania case sheds at least some substantive light on this problem by
discussing what it means to regulate directly the content of academics. See infra notes 217-28 and
accompanying text.
192. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 521.
193. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
194. Id. at 237-38.
195. Id. at 243.
196. Id. at 244.
197. Id. at 244-45.
198. Id. at 250-51 (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.). Two concurring Justices also adopted
this view. Id. at 261-62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 251-54 (plurality opinion) (conceding the "fundamental interest of the state" in
rooting out subversives, but finding that the authorized investigative procedures were excessively
intrusive and failed to meet this interest satisfactorily); Id. at 265 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(finding that New Hampshire's interest was not compelling).
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freedom. o0
The plurality justified this extraordinary protection by noting that
colleges and universities play a special role in American society by pro-
viding a forum for questioning the values, beliefs, and principles of soci-
ety in order to better understand society. 0 1 All fields of academic study
remain either incomplete or open to new discoveries or ideas, particu-
larly the social sciences. 02 The primary motivation of academics is the
pursuit of further knowledge in these incomplete areas. In this environ-
ment, governmental suppression of ideas collides with the special role
of the university. Thus, the Sweezy plurality concluded that govern-
ment regulation of academics would stifle scholarship and eventually
cause society to stagnate and die.203
Justice Frankfurter, in an influential concurrence in Sweezy, found
that the state interest in investigating the violent overthrow of the gov-
ernment was not sufficiently compelling. 20 4 For Justice Frankfurter, ac-
ademic freedom depended on excluding government from the four
essential freedoms that universities require: hiring, subject matter,
manner of teaching, and admissions. 20 5 Justice Frankfurter believed
that scholarship would decline without freedom from governmental in-
trusion in these areas.20 6
By finding that unrestricted academic speech is an invaluable re-
quirement for a democratic society, the plurality and Justice Frank-
furter implied that the government could not regulate the content of
scholarship explicitly or implicitly.20 7 To regulate content would impair
the scholarly quest for truth. The Supreme Court, however, has left the
limits of academic freedom unclear.20 8 Thus, several unanswered ques-
tions persist. What governmental interest is sufficiently compelling to
justify an intrusion into academic and political freedom? For the pur-
200. Id. at 251.
201. Id. at 250.
202. Id.
203. Id. Chief Justice Warren would certainly agree with the philosophy expressed by Profes-
sor Meiklejohn, supra note 189, that academics are vital to self-government. Universities and col-
leges train the young, who are the future leaders of the nation. To prevent the universities from
pursuing truth would limit the ability of these youth to govern themselves effectively. In this man-
ner, civilization would stagnate and die. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
204. Id. at 261.
205. Id. at 263 (citation omitted).
206. Id. at 262. Justice Frankfurter also seems to be in accord with Professor Meiklejohn's
philosophy on the importance of academia, supra note 189, in asserting that "[t]hese pages need
not be burdened with proof ... of the dependence of a free society on free universities." Id.
207. See supra notes 168, 171.
208. See Byrne, supra note 191, at 293, 295 (characterizing Sweezy as "an ambiguous
description of the relationship between academic custom and positive legal right" and Keyishian
as being "extraordinarily vague").
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poses of the NEH, is the expenditure of taxpayer funds a sufficiently
compelling interest to justify a content-based regulation?
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,"°9 the Supreme Court also pro-
vided little guidance on the meaning of academic freedom. In Keyi-
shian, some professors refused to certify that they were not communists
and were fired.210 The professors sought reinstatement, arguing that the
required certification violated their First Amendment rights. 11
The Supreme Court struck down the certification requirements,
finding them to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.1 s While
basing its holding on other grounds, the Court paid homage to the im-
portance of academic freedom.213 The Court found that academic free-
dom was a special concern of the First Amendment that merited strict
scrutiny under the void for vagueness theory.21 4 The Court appeared to
be most afraid of regulations that would impose orthodox views on the
classroom.21 5 While extolling the importance of academic freedom and
arguing for its extended protection, the Court in Keyishian, as in
Sweezy, gave little guidance on the scope of academic freedom. The
Keyishian case, however, does stand for the proposition that violations
of academic freedom must receive strict scrutiny analysis.216
Recently the Supreme Court addressed the scope of academic free-
dom in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC.21 7 In University of Penn-
sylvania, a Chinese-American female professor was denied tenure.1 e
She sought discovery in a Title VII suit of her tenure review files in the
hopes of uncovering evidence of discrimination. 2 9 The University of
Pennsylvania claimed that such discovery would violate the academic
freedom of a university to control hiring through the tenure system.2 2
The University of Pennsylvania also argued that the confidentiality of
the peer review files was an essential feature of the tenure decision
process.221
The Court held that the peer review files fell outside the scope of
209. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
210. Id. at 592.
211. Id. at 592, 597-604.
212. Id. at 604, 609.
213. Id. at 601-04. The Court discussed academic freedom as a part of its discussion of why
the regulation was void for vagueness.
214. Id. at 603-04.
215. Id. at 603.
216. The Rust court cited Keyishian for this point. Rust v. Sullivan 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776
(1991).
217. 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990).
218. Id. at 580.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 586.
-221. Id.
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academic freedom and, therefore, were subject to discovery.222 In ex-
plaining its decisions in Sweezy and Keyishian, the Court gave specific
content to the concept of academic freedom. First, the court noted that
the government may not place content-based regulations on scholarship
in universities due to the idea of academic freedom. 2 3 The Court held,
however, that discovery of the University of Pennsylvania's peer review
files did not affect the content of scholarship at the university. 224
Second, the court determined that the government may not place
direct regulations on the hiring decisions of universities.225 In the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania case, discovery of the files did not place any
requirements on the University as to hiring.226 Discovery merely made
the hiring process public. It did not force the University to institute any
changes in its process. If the University were to change the hiring pro-
cess out of fear of public disclosure, the government did not compel
those changes directly.227 The Court left open the possibility, however,
that indirect regulation also might raise First Amendment issues if the
regulation creates a sufficiently direct burden on speech.228
The University of Pennsylvania opinion relied on one of Justice
Frankfurter's four requirements for academic freedom, the freedom to
chose who may teach, but the Court did not address the other three.229
The fact that the Court readily adopted one of these requirements im-
plies that the Court in some future case also will adopt the other three
as essential to academic freedom. Thus, a regulation also may not in-
fringe upon the subject matter of scholarship, the manner of teaching,
or the admissions at a university.
IV. THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The works of Andres Serrano and Robert Mapplethorpe undoubt-
edly challenge mainstream values in a profound and visceral way. In-
deed, these works sparked a controversy in which advocates waged a
vigorous debate over values, particularly over which values merit the
attention of the American public and which do not. One participant in
the debate characterized it as a "struggle[] to define [the] moral and
222. Id. at 587.
223. Id. at 586-87.
224. Id. at 587.
225. Id. at 587-88.
226. Id. at 588.
227. Id. at 587-88.
228. Id. at 588.
229. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (listing the other freedoms proposed by Jus-
tice Frankfurter.)
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ethical foundations" of American society.3 0 The fact that such a funda-
mental debate occurred in close proximity to the National Endowment
for the Humanities creates the possibility of content-based regulation in
the future. Together with the fact that the 1989 restrictions applied di-
rectly to the NEH, the possibility of content-based regulations raises
serious questions over the proper role of government funding for the
humanities. Should the Congress, or even state and local humanities
agencies, be allowed to place restrictive limitations on the content of
NEH projects? Should funding criteria involving the acceptability of a
project to mainstream America supplant or intrude on the traditional
funding criteria of scholarly merit?
Because the NEH funds projects which deal with fundamental val-
ues in a direct way, through scholarly inquiry in such fields as history,
literature, art, and religion, these questions of governmental involve-
ment are important. While to date the NEH has not been subject to the
same intense controversy or scrutiny as the NEA, the NEH is not im-
mune from such an occurrence. Unpopular ideas about values in the
humanities and social sciences exist, and, given exposure to mainstream
America, may generate hostility. When NEH funds are involved, such
hostility will tend to increase because the government, through the use
of taxpayer funds, is the patron. The result of such hostility will be
content-based limitations in the style of the 1989 restrictions.
Content limitations on the NEH also may arise in another way.
The NEA may again become the subject of controversy over a funded
project. Congressional response to this controversy may extend to the
NEH as well as to the NEA target. This happened in 1989 when the
NEH received content-based regulations as a result of an NEA
controversy.
Facing the threat of content-based regulation, the NEH may look
to the First Amendment doctrines of unconstitutional conditions and
academic freedom for protection. The doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions applies to NEH funding decisions because content-based regula-
tion would seek to suppress dangerous ideas. According to the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the government may not aim at
suppressing dangerous ideas. Provocative scholarship could be consid-
ered by some to be dangerous ideas worthy of suppression. Thus, a de-
nial of a subsidy could be used to prevent the public dissemination of
such ideas. The Supreme Court has consistently applied the doctrine to
prevent the government from regulating indirectly what it cannot regu-
late directly. The Court's latest pronouncement on this doctrine in Rust
230. 135 CONG. REc. H9440 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1990) (statement of Rep. Robert Dornan).
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v. Sullivan,23 1 recognizes the importance of this doctrine in protecting
the academic freedom of scholars.
Academic freedom may be seen as the protection against the sup-
pression of dangerous ideas in academia. A majority of the Court in
Sweezy refused to sanction regulations based on the content of aca-
demic speech due to the special role of the university and the inherent
value of scholarship. Under the University of Pennsylvania case, the
government cannot regulate scholarship directly. Regulation of scholar-
ship at a university would destroy the independent environment that is
crucial to the functioning of a university.
The NEH is not a university or a college. It teaches no classes and
does not conduct independent research directly. However, the mission
of the NEH and the universities is the same. Both entities support
scholars and promote them on the basis of scholarly excellence. In this
respect, the NEH is like a public university without enrolled students.
Instead of educating students, the mission of the NEH is to educate the
general public. And instead of granting degrees or tenure as a reward
for excellence, the NEH grants money to pursue scholarly excellence.
Therefore, the principles of First Amendment law that protect scholar-
ship at universities should be applied with equal vigor to the context of
the NEH grants.
For the purposes of the funded project, the government and the
NEH grantee are subject to the same limitations that govern the rela-
tionship between the government and the university. Once the univer-
sity decides on the basis of scholarly merit to employ or grant tenure to
a professor, the government may not disturb that relationship because
the scholar's work is controversial or unpopular. To do so would consti-
tute an illegitimate attempt to suppress dangerous ideas. Similarly, the
government may not attempt to suppress dangerous ideas through the
grant or denial of an NEH grant. While there is no right to such a sub-
sidy, the governi~aent may not deny one for reasons that violate the aca-
demic freedom of potential recipients.
To allow the government to infringe on academic freedom through
the use of content-based regulations would impair the functioning of
the NEH. While the NEH disseminates scholarship in mainstream soci-
ety, limitations on recipients would prevent the dissemination of new or
controversial ideas in the United States. The sequestration of such
ideas is the particular danger that academic freedom seeks to prevent.
231. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
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V. CONCLUSION
Throughout its history, the NEA has been the subject of contro-
versy. Its counterpart, the NEH, has avoided similar controversy but,
nonetheless, has been the subject of content-based regulation. Although
currently free of such restrictions, the NEH could be faced with further
regulation in the future. In such a case, the NEH should look to the
First Amendment doctrines of unconstitutional conditions and aca-
demic freedom for protection.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine prevents the government
from placing conditions on subsidies in ways that violate the fundamen-
tal rights of potential recipients. The doctrine is particularly applicable
when the government attempts to suppress dangerous ideas through the
imposition of such conditions. In addition, although some may view
provocative scholarship as dangerous ideas worthy of suppression, the
doctrine of academic freedom specifically recognizes the importance of
protecting such scholarship from content-based regulation. Because the
quest for all scholarly knowledge promotes the good of society, both
these doctrines should require the application of strict scrutiny analysis
to any content-based regulation.
Universities participate in the quest for scholarly knowledge, and,
thus, receive strict First Amendment protection through the doctrine of
academic freedom. Because the NEH also participates in this quest, it
should receive the same strict protection. Permitting any less protection
would violate traditional notions of First Amendment freedoms.
Alvaro Ignacio Anillo*
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